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DEFENSE SPENDING AND ECONOMIC GROwrH 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
By 
Basudeb Biswas 
~ 
DEFENSE SPENDING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Economic implications of defense spending can be studied from different 
perspectives. One basic concept of economics is that given our technical knowledge 
and endowment of resources, more production of one commodity results in less 
production of some other commodity. More real spending in the military sphere leads 
to a reduction of funds for production of civilian goods. This basic fact is reflected in 
high hopes of receMng a -peace dividend- from less spending on defense following 
the end of the cold war. According to the Human Development Report (United 
Nations Development Programme, 1992), worldwide military spending has been falling 
in the late 1980s as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Trends in global military spending 
Developing 
Countries 
Developing Industrial as%of 
Countries Countries World World 
Military expenditures (US$ billions) 
1960 35 385 420 8.3 
1970 75 545 620 12.1 
1980 137 618 755 18.1 
1984 155 750 905 17.1 
1987 132 838 970 13.6 
1990 123 762 885 13.9 
Annual growth rates (%) 
1960-70 7.9 3.5 4.0 
1970-80 6.2 1.3 2.0 
1980-90 -1.1 2.1 1.6 
1980-84 3.1 5.0 4.6 
1984-87 -5.2 3.8 2.3 
1987-90 -2.3 -3.1 -3.0 
Source: United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report. (New York: Oxford 
University Press. 1992). 
Industrial countries decreased their total military spending from about $838 billion in 
1987 to $762 billion in 1990 in constant 1988 U.S. dollars. The corresponding figures 
for the developing countries are $132 billion in 1987 and $123 billion in 1990. 
The same analysis that applies to the choice between military goods and civilian 
goods can also be applied to the choice between production for current consumption 
and production for future consumption. Defense spending cannot contribute to a 
nation's ability to produce more economic goods and services in the future. More 
public expenditure in the military sector leads to crowding out of private investment 
and less investment on public goods like health, education, and scientific research. 
Thus, from both the short-run and the long-run points of view a decline in military 
spending will attain the primary objective of development, that is, to benefit people. 
A possible beneficial effed of defense expenditure lies in its role in creating 
effective demand when there is slack in the economy. Within the Keynesian 
framework··cf macroeconomic analysis, govemment expenditure on goods and 
services including defense is an important force in the determination of output and 
employment. From this perspective, military spending or any other form of 
govemment spending has the potential of achieving full employment output. 
The approach of this study about the impad of military expenditures on 
economic growth is somewhat different from those mentioned above. Treating 
defense expenditures as autonomous, mainly determined by strategic consideration 
and threat and security, one can argue that defense expenditures may have 
developmental side effects. The argument runs in the following manner. The military 
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is an organized sector and helps building of the infrastructures and contributes to 
technological progress. The military sector helps in the process of modemization 
through establishment of allocative efficiency improving institution. The civilian sector 
gets the benefits of the economic ·spin-off' from the military sector. It is also 
hypothesized that factor productivities may be greater in the military sector than in the 
civilian sector. In an earlier work. Biswas and Ram (1986) focused on this dimension 
of the relation between military expenditure and economic growth and esti.mated 
parameters within a production function framework. Results obtained in that analysis 
were compared with those of Rothschild (19n). Benoit (1978). Frederiksen and 
Looney (1982). Urn (1983). and Deger and Sen (1983). and Leontief and Duchin 
(1983). The Biswas and Ram study was based on data for the periods 1960-70 and 
1970-n. and a sample of 58 less-developed countries was taken. The main objective 
of this study is replication of the empirical part of the earlier study. The present study 
is based on a sample of 74 LDCs and covers the period from 1981 to 1989 during the 
first part of which there was an increase in military spending and a decrease in the 
second half (fable 1). 
The main point emerging from this work is that. in contrast with the results 
reported in Biswas and Ram (1986). the defense outlays seem to have a positive effect 
on economic growth for 1981-89. 
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Evidence in the Conventional Framework 
We start with a simple neoclassical production function in which labor (l), 
: 
capital (K), and military spending (M) enter as -inputs- into a single aggregated output 
(Y). By taking total derivatives and manipulating the expression, one can derive the 
following growth equation: 
. I·· Y = Po + P1 (-) + P2 L + PaM + U I Y 
where Y is the annual rate of growth of total output (GOP), I/y is the investment-
output ratio, l snd AI are, respectively, the annual rates of growth of the labor 
force and the military expenditure variables, and U is the classical stochastic 
disturbance term. /31 reflects the marginal product of capital, and /32 and /33 are the 
elasticities of output with respect to labor and military expenditures. Equation (1) is 
used as the basic empirical equation in this section. 
(1) 
Ttle ~ple covers 74 countries, and ttle J?8riod extends form 1981 through 
1989.1 Following the World Bank's classification, low-income and middle-income LOCs 
are treated separately, and pooled sample estimates are also reported.2 
The estimates in Table 2 indicate that defense expenditure has a significantly 
positive effect on economic growth. This is in contrast with the result of the earlier 
study by Biswas and Ram (1986). However, when one looks at the estimates for the 
low-income and the middle-income groups separately, the quantitative effect is much 
less in the low-income countries.3 
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Table 2. Some Statistical Results on the Relation Between Military Expenditures and 
Economic Growth in LDCs. 1981-89: Conventional Models 
I 
- . i y. 
1981-89 
Full sample 0.121** 0.568* 0.081 .20 
(N = 74) (2.977) (1.743) (3.036) 
Low-income LDCs 0.146** -0.472 0.052 . • 26 
(N = 30) (2.090) (-0.697) (2.237) 
Middle-income LDCs 0.117* 0.526 0.229** .30 
(N = 44) (1.940) (1.337) (3.074) 
Note: Dependent variable is the average annual rate of growth of GOP over the 
period. A constant term is included in all regressions, but its estimates are not 
reported. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at least at the 5% level. 
Military Expenditures and Economic Growth: 
An Augmented Neoclassical Model 
We briefly mentioned some hypotheses about the manner in which increased 
defense spending may affect growth favorably or unfavorably. Most researchers 
probably recognize two important mechanisms through which military expenditures 
may affect economic growth: (a) the military sector may, for a variety of reasons, 
generate positive or negative externalities for the rest of the economy, and (b) there 
may be important factor productivity differences. The conventional framework 
represented in equation (1) can be rationalized in terms of an "external effect.· but it 
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cannot throw light on a possible productivity differential. The model described below 
was specified by Feder in the context of a study of the role of exports in growth.4 The 
Feder model has been adapted as a .. two-sector framework to assess the extemality 
effect of military expenditures and the factor productivity variation between the military 
and the civilian sectors. The model is built on the neoclassical production-function 
framework and leads to a linear regression equation similar to the conventional 
specifications. The basic features of the model have been explained in Biswas and 
Ram (1986) and are briefly mentioned here. 
In contrast with a one-sector framework of the conventional model. the 
economy is now divided into two sectors. The military sector output is designated as 
M and the civilian sector output is designated as C. Assume that labor (L) and capital 
. 
(I<) are the only inputs in each sector. The relative marginal products of labor and 
capital may differ aaoss the two sectors and the size of the military sector output may 
act as ~ri ;eXtemaJity" factor for the civilian sector. The basic equations can be written 
as follows: 
Y=C+M 
C=CfLc,Kc,M} 
M=M(L""K.J 
(2a) 
(2b) 
(2c) 
where the lowercase subsaipts c and m denote sectoral inputs. Postulating that the 
total input usage is given, 
and Kc + K", = K 
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(3c) 
(3d) 
Using input subscripts to denote partial derivatives of the production functions with 
respect to the inputs. let 
(4) 
Equation (4) indicates that the ratio of respective marginal factor productivities 
in the two sectors deviates from unity by 8 factor 6. Om (:: ao) would represent 
am 
the marginal externality effect of military output on the civilian sector. If Cm > 0 and/or 
6 > A. increased military output will imply a higher rate of growth of total output Y, 
which is the sum of M and C for a given usage of L and K Taking the total 
differentials of equations 28, 2b. 2c. 3c, and 3d one can write the following: 
dY=dC+dM 
dC = 0LdLe + C,pKe + C",dM 
dM :: MLdLm + MpKm 
dLe + dLm = elL 
dKe + dKm = dK 
(Sa) 
(Sb) 
(Sc) 
(68) 
(6b) 
As explained by Biswas and Ram (1986). the model yields the following econometric 
specifications: 
dY I dL 6 dM 
- = Ck - + CL- + (-- + C ) -y Y Y 1 +6 m Y (7) 
. I • 6 · M Y = a(-) + P (L) + (- +Cm](M-] 
Y 1 +6 Y 
(8) 
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In equation (8), as in equation(1), a dot over a variable denotes its rate of growth, and 
!.. and M are the conventional notations for the ratios of investment and y y 
military spending to the total output.5 Equation (8) enables a test of hypothesis that 
both Cm and 6 are zero. In that case, the coefficient of M (':> Is zero and the 
expression reduces to the standard growth equation. To estimate separately the 
externality effect em and the relative factor productivity differential &, further 
manipulation is needed. Making one simplifying assumption that the elasticity of 
civilian output with respect to military output is constant one gets the following form 
Y = u (1) + pel) + ( 6 )[M(M») + 61.4 
Y 1 + 6 Y 
where 6 is the elasticity of civilian output with respect to military output, that is, 
(9) 
o = eM (~). Equation (9) allows the extemality effect Cm and the relative factor 
productiyity differential & to be separately identified. 
Average variable values for the period 1981-89 are used. Average growth of 
real military expenditures is derived by fitting an exponential trend function to the 
constant dollar expenditures given in SIPRI year books. Equations (8) and (9) are 
) 
estimated to provide information regarding the impact of military expenditures on 
overall economic growth through the externality effect and/or due to the sectoral 
factor productivity differential. 
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Empirical Tests for the Augmented Model 
Table 3 presents estimates of equations (8) and (9) for the full sample and also 
for the subsamples for 1981-89. Estimated coefficients of M (~) for equation (8) 
for the full sample and for the subsamples are statistically significant. For equation (9), 
. . M 
none of the estimated coefficients of M or M( -y) for the full sample or for the 
subsamples are significant. That is consistent with the estimates in Table 2 that 
indicate a positive overall effect of military expenditures on growth. However, for the 
extended equation (9). neither the coefficient of M· nor that of M( ~) is significant 
at any reasonable level in any of the samples. Perhaps collinearity between these two 
variables lowers the precision of the estimates. Therefore, while one may say that the 
overall effect of military outlays on LDe growth is positive, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether it is the externality effect or the fador-productivity differential that is more 
impo~. 
Concluding Remarks 
This work was motivated by the consideration of replicating an earlier study by 
Biswas and Ram (1986) about the impact of military expenditures on economic 
growth. Econometric results are often fragile. In Leamer's (1983, p. 43) terms, -if we 
are to make effective use of our scarce data resource, it is therefore important that we 
study fragility in a much more systematic way. - With a view to improving quality of 
prior research, this work uses the same model but a more recent data set. 
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Table 3 Some Statistical Results on the Relation Between Military Expenditure and 
Economic Growth in LDCs, 1981-89: Augmented Growth Model 
I i. M(M) M R2 -Y Y 
Full sample 0.137 .... 0.573" 0.018 .... .22 
(N = 74) (3.351) (1.786) (3.413) 
0.136 .... 0.573" 0.016 0.008 .22 
(3.264) (1.n3) (1.463) (0.156) 
Low income LOCs 0.184 .... -0.387 0.013 .... .30 
(N = 30) (2.537) (-0.585) (2.617) 
0.189 .... 
-0.384 0.015 -0.010 0.300 
(2.442) (-0.570) (1.235) (-0.193) 
Middle income LDCs 0.129 .... 0.558 0.040 .... .30 
(N = 44) (2.155) (1.426) (3.091) 
0.122 .... 0.515 0.023 0.131 .32 
(2.031) (1.317) (1.242) (1.27) 
~nventional estimates reported in Table 2 indicate a positive effect of military 
expenditures on economic growth for the full sample and for both subsamples. The 
augmented model supports that proposition represented in equation (8). However, 
the extended model of equation (9) indicates no significant externality effect or factor-
productivity differential. It is possible that high correlation between M and M( ~) 
lowers the precision of the estimates, and it is difficult to judge whether it is the 
externality effect or the factor-productivity differential that is more important. On the 
whole, one may say that, in contrast with the results obtained by Biswas and Ram 
(1986), the more recent data indicate positive effect of military outlays on LDC growth. 
However, caution is obviously needed in drawing strong inferences from such results. 
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Endnotes 
I would like to thank Rati Ram for specific comments which I have incorporated 
in the present version. Of course, tfle author alone is responsible for any remaining 
errors or shortcomings. The financial support of the economics department of Utah 
State University is greatfully acknowledged. Competent research assistance was 
rendered by Sarita Mahapatra and Joan-Ho Lee. 
1. Data on military expenditures are taken from Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1987, 1991). Data on labor force growth and growth of GOP are from 
World Bank, World Development Report 1991, and all other variables are from World 
Bank, World Tables, 2d ad. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991). 
2. Following the terminology in World Bank. World Development Report 1979. a low 
income developing country is defined as one with a per capita GNP of US $580 or less 
in 1989 (on the basis of conventional exchange rates); middle-income LDCs are those 
having per capita GNP of more than $580 but less than $SOOO in 1989. 
3. The coefficient of I/Y is positive and statistically significant. However, its magnitude 
appears small. Also, as may be expected. the labor coefficient is not significant for low-
income LoCs. 
4. Feder's methodology is detailed in Gershon Feder, ·On Exports and Economic 
Growth,· Journal of Development Economics 12 (February-April 1983): 59-73. See also 
Feder, pp. 61-68. 
5. For example, Y stand for 4 Y /V. and similar remarks apply to Land M. Feder's 
notation in this respect, as in some others, is different. He uses a dot over the variable 
to denote its absolute increase, not its rate of growth. 
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Appendix A 
Sample Countries 
Argentina, Bangladesh*, Benin*, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Central Africa, Chad, Chile, Columbia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote O'ivore, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, EI Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, 
Madagascar*, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali*, Mauritania*, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, 
' -
Mozambique*, Nepal*, Nicaragua, Niger*, Nigeria*, Oman, Pakistan*, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone*, 
Somalia*, South Korea, Sri Lanka*, Syria, Tanzania*, Thailand, Togo*, Trinidad and 
Tobago, .Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda*, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire*, Zambia*, 
Zimbabwe. 
*Low-income LDCs. 
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Appendix B 
Country Name AI M I L Y - -y y 
Argentina -7.429 4.688888 18.37777 1.4 ~.3 
Bangladesh* 5.464 1.466666 14.98888 2.6 3.5 
Benin* ~.283 1.957142 17.73333 3.2 1.8 
Bolivia -4.405 3.7 15.37777 2.7 ~.9 
Botswana 11.688 2.955555 29.12222 3.4 11.3 
BrazH 1.13 1.23333 24.47777 2.2 3 
Burkina Faso* 4.357 2.911111 23.65555 2.6 5 
Burundl* -2.372 3 17.29999 2.9 4.3 
Cameron 2.558 1.8666666 27.75555 3.2 3.2 
Central Africa* -1.398 2 13.8 2.7 1.4 
Chad * 58.932 6.06 8.128568 2.4 6.5 
ChUe 0.5454 7.933333 20.44444 1.7 2.7 
Colombia 9.283 2.055555 24.81111 2 3.5 
Congo 1.495 2.7 36.93333 3.4 3.9 
Costa Rica -0.302 0.577777 30.41111 2.4 2.8 
Cote O'ivore 0.44 1.111111 11.42333 4.1 1.2 
Dominican Republic -5.976 1.444444 27.51111 2.3 2.4 
Equador 3.694 1.744444 26.4 2.7 1.9 
Egypt -4.422 6.255555 36.2555 2.5 5.4 
E. Salvador -5.36 4.077777 31.3333 1.4 0.6 
Ethiopla* 5.8503 9.188888 13.17777 3 1.9 
Gabon 2.056 3.022222 38.37777 3.7 1.2 
Ghana* 7.0474 0.688888 18.67777 3.4 2.8 
Greece -0.907 6.533333 24.65555 0.4 1.6 
Guatemala 3.052 2.577777 14.64999 2.9 0.4 
Haiti* 1.1143 1.285714 14.72222 1.9 ~.5 
Honduras 13.255 - 4.588888 18.85555 3.5 2.3 
Hungary 5.33 2.9 30.76666 ~.2 1.6 
Indla* 7.3082 3.311111 24.38888 2.1 5.3 
Indonesla* -44.124 3.3 30.21111 2.1 5.3 
Iran ~613 3.457142 21.66666 3.5 3.4 
Jamaica -8.537 1.2375 26.34999 1.3 1.2 
Kenya* -0.835 3.177777 24.5 3.9 4.1 
Madagascar* -7.003 2.311111 12.5 2.9 0.8 
MaIawi* -4.853 2.244444 18.33333 3.4 2.7 
Malaysia -2.299 6.522222 21.66666 2.6 4.9 
MaJi* 6.052 2.528571 22.74444 2.5 3.8 
Mauritanla* -16.082 7.475 29.01111 2.4 1.4 
Mauritius 2.587 2.77777 27.4 1 5.9 
Mexico -7.578 0.575 27.7 2.1 0.7 
Morocco 0.053 5.411111 31.28888 2.6 4.1 
Mozambique* 7.153 9.983333 20.61111 2.7 -1.4 
Nepal * 13.924 1.366666 21.83333 2.6 4.6 
Nicaragua 1.121 15.94444 29.41427 3.4 -1.6 
Niger* 3.7436 0.722222 14.66666 3.4 -1.6 
Nigeria* -14.794 1.533333 16.25555 3.4 ~.4 
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country Name 
Oman 
Pakistan· 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
PhHipines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Rwanda· 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone· 
Somalia· 
South Korea 
Sri Lanka· 
Syria 
Tanzania· 
Thaland 
Togo· 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda· 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Yugosl~ 
Zaire· 
Zambia· 
Zimbabwe 
4.384 
7.986 
9.743 
0.135 
.().064 
-5.5 
3.0848 
2.846 
-1.237 
9.296 
-19.834 
-12.827 
6.3171 
23.302 
-10.646 
3.981 
2.064 
10.657 
-9.05 
5.517 
2.107 
-5.448 
-6.647 
-3.952 
-1.284 
-1.687 
-7.254 
5.244 
M 
y 
21.34444 
6.622222 
1.711111 
1.266666 
6 
1.744444 
3.111111 
3.3 
1.825 
"2.6 
0.8 
3.055555 
5.177777 
2.5 
14.16666 
4288888 
4.755555 
2.477777 
2.571428 
4.88888 
4.544444 
3.511111 
2.833333 
2.511111 
3.944444 
1.666666 
3.488888 
6.311111 
AI 
- Annual rate of growth of mlitary expenditure. 
l 
- Annual) rate of growth of labor force. 
y 
- Annual rate of growth of gross domestic produd. 
I 
-Y - Investment output ratio. 
M 
-
- MUitary expenditure output ratio. y 
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I 
Y 
29.925 
19.55555 
24.44444 
31.13333 
31.97777 
27.65555 
31.52222 
36.36666 
16.66666 
23.06666 
13.88888 
27.4 
22.05555 
26.36666 
31.06249 
21.21249 
33.87777 
25.28888 
12.60555 
34.76666 
30.53333 
12.04444 
19.08888-
29.4 
45.57777 
11.67777 
17.95555 
23.24444 
l 
4.7 12.8 
3.2 6.4 
2.2 0.5 
3.2 2.2 
2.3 0.4 
2.5 0.7 
0.7 2.5 
0.6 2.5 
3.2 1.5 
3 3.1 
2.4 0.6 
3 3 
1.2 9.7 
1.5 4 
3.6 1.6 
3.1 2.6 
1.9 7 
3.5 1.4 
1.7 -5.5 
2.5 3.4 
2.4 5.1 
3.2 2.5 
0.6 0.1 
2.8 1 
0.7 1.3 
3.1 1.9 
3.7 0.8 
3.5 2.7 
